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Perpetuating Genocide: Intentional International Neglect in the East Timor Crisis
In 2002, Timor-Leste finally attained the independence that its people had declared
twenty-seven years ago in 1975. In the years between these events, Indonesia invaded and
occupied the small island, killing citizens, destroying infrastructure, and denying the Timorese
the right to self-determination guaranteed by international law. For years, Indonesia operated
with impunity, as economic interests with Indonesia and impotence caused major powers like the
United States, Australia, Portugal, and the United Nations to intentionally neglect the situation.
Telegrams, memorandums, recordings, and other internal documents show that both the U.S. and
Australia had knowledge of the events occurring in East Timor but instead chose to believe the
false information given by Indonesia in order to continue fostering a beneficial relationship with
Indonesia. Had either the U.S. or Australia acted against Indonesia’s invasion, the subjugation of
the Timorese people could have been avoided. In the 1990s, increasing public information
concerning East Timor as well as the growth in popularity of humanitarian philosophy finally
outweighed economic interests of the U.S. and Australia. The resultant changes to the foreign
policies of these governments led directly to East Timor finally becoming a sovereign nation.
Historical Background of East Timor
The Colonial Years
In the early sixteenth century, Portugal and the Netherlands sought to expand their
empires through colonization of the many islands of the Indonesian archipelago. Both countries
laid claim to Timor, an island rich in sandalwood located approximately 400 miles from the
northern shore of Australia. Boundaries between the Dutch and Portuguese settlements were
constantly disputed and redrawn over four-hundred years until final resolution in 1913 with the
Sentenca Arbitral, drafted at the International Court of Justice. While Portugal had entered the
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sixteenth century as a formidable international power, by the time of the Sentenca Arbitral its
prosperity had steeply declined and domestic instability was on the rise. The treaty relinquished
all Portuguese rights to the Indonesian archipelago except for the territory defined as East Timor,
a small fraction of its original holdings.1
Prior to and following the Sentenca Arbitral, Portugal’s control over its colony was
tenuous at best. Portuguese Timor was ruled indirectly through liurai, local kings who were
given military rank and allowed to maintain rule as long as they remained loyal to Portugal.
Despite this, cooperation from the liurai was often absent. This problem was exacerbated by
Portuguese exploitation of rivalries between the liurai, creating lasting divisions among
Timorese.2 Still, despite these divisions, Timorese rose in rebellion against Portugal on several
occasions: in 1710, causing the relocation of Portuguese control to the city of Dili; in 1861,
against forced imposition of coffee cultivation; and in 1908, against a head tax.3 Timor’s distance
from Portugal, combined with declining sandalwood prices and the fall of the Portuguese
monarchy, meant that as time progressed, fewer resources were dedicated to insuring peace or
prosperity for the colony. Though Portugal maintained its colonial hold over East Timor in the
Sentenca Arbitral, both its domestic tranquility and control over East Timor were in weak
condition as the twentieth century progressed.
World War II
With the exception of the territorial push-and-pull between the Netherlands and Portugal,
Timor had remained relatively isolated from the world for most of its existence. In 1942,
however, this changed. World War II had begun and the island’s unique location in the
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Indonesian archipelago left the small government at the mercy of warring international
superpowers. Though Portugal had declared its neutrality in the conflict, Allied forces feared that
the Japanese would invade Timor to gain a base of operations where attacks against Australia
could be easily launched. To stop this from happening, Australia, with limited support from the
other Allied forces, committed a force of nearly five-hundred men to the defense of the island. In
response, the Japanese military sent 20,000 soldiers, ousting the Allied troops and subjugating
Portuguese Timor to brutal Japanese occupation until 1945.
Despite the large disparity in military force, the Allied troops were able to mount an
extremely successful attack against the Japanese forces, losing forty of their own men but
inflicting losses upwards of 1,500 men.4 Without the support of the Timorese people, many of
whom not only supported but fought alongside with the Allied troops, this would not have been
possible. Following the withdrawal of the Allied troops, the Timorese paid dearly for their role in
resisting the Japanese forces: between 40,000 and 60,000 men and women were tortured and
killed, with many women forced to join the wartime network of sexual slavery.5 The Japanese
military force absorbed all available supplies of the island, leaving its inhabitants without food.
Allied forces, since withdrawn from Timor, ordered successive bombing raids that killed many
Timorese and few Japanese soldiers. Considering the damages that resulted from the Allied
withdrawal, in terms of infrastructure and human loss of life, Australian veterans as well as the
Australian public recognized the debt and gratitude they owed the Timorese for their support.6
Decades later, this relationship would spawn a grassroots movement supporting Timorese
independence.
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Following the close of Japanese occupation and the return to power of Portugal, tensions
continued between Portugal and East Timor. Practices such as whipping prisoners, forcing them
to “…stand on coral stone, hot from the scorching sun, with their feet shackled” led to another
uprising in 1959.7 Following the uprising, liberation wars in its African colonies of Angola,
Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau consumed Portugal’s attentions and resources. East Timor
continued to slowly rebuild its infrastructure and economy from wartime destruction. Though
Portugal declared East Timor a province of Portugal in 1963 and subsequently afforded a greater
Timorese voice within government, overall no serious opposition to the established Portuguese
dictatorship was allowed and severe censorship of the media continued.8 In these postwar years,
East Timor had returned to its status as a low-priority, isolated extension of Portuguese power.
Uncertainty and Civil War
The expense of fighting wars on three different fronts throughout the 1960s drained
Portugal’s resources and generated resentment among Portuguese people. Economic policies that
enforced trade relations between these African colonies and Portugal also created a class of
embittered business professionals who desired to focus on European investments instead.9
Ultimately, these wars and the associated negative consequences led to political turbulence
within the country. A particularly frustrated class, soldiers formed the Movimento das Forças
Armadas (MFA) around a series of democratic ideals and socialist reform. In 1974, the MFA
successfully launched a bloodless military coup. In support of the MFA, citizens lined the streets
and placed carnations in the barrels of unfired guns, leading to the coup’s designation as the
“Carnation Revolution.” Soon after their seizure of the government, the MFA decreed that all
colonies would be released from Portuguese control in accordance with the colonists’ right to
7
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self-determination. Despite the fact that MFA was a military movement, its leaders recognized
that the best way to end the African wars was with a quick withdrawal. Mozambique and
Guinea-Bissau had actually attained military superiority over Portugal and there was little to no
public or political support for continued warfare.10 Though these decisions were made in
consideration to Portugal’s African colonies, they had a dramatic impact for East Timor.
Prior to the Carnation Revolution, no political parties and a low amount of political
activity existed in East Timor. Following the announcement of decolonization, however, three
major political parties formed in East Timor: Uniao Democratica Timorese (UDT), Frente
Revolucionara de Timor Leste Independence (FRETILIN, originally known as ASDT), and
Associacao Integracao Timor-Indonesia (AITI, later known as APODETI). The two largest of
the parties, FRETILIN and UDT, both advocated for independence for East Timor. Though they
shared this common goal, their bases of popular support divided them. UDT drew support from
government officials, tribal chiefs, Catholic Church officials, and other upper class members of
society. Its leaders described the UDT not as a socialist party, but a “social democrat” party.11 In
contrast, FRETILIN held the support of the lower and middle classes. This support base,
combined with its use of neo-Marxist rhetoric, lent to the perception of FRETILIN as a radical
movement.12 This perception would later be emphasized and distorted into purported evidence of
FRETILIN’s communist nature by Indonesia in an attempt to influence the actions of highly
anticommunist countries like the United States and Australia. In reality, FRETILIN represented a
philosophy unique to the Timorese people, often referred to as “mauberism” in the native Tetum
language. Mauberism embodies a “…general struggle against poverty, illiteracy, and economic
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and political oppression.”13 While similarities can be drawn between mauberism and the theory
of communism, the political links with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that many
international actors feared Timor held never truly existed.
Unfortunately, the differences between FRETILIN and UDT proved to be extremely
divisive. Indonesia, while it outwardly portrayed a nominal interest in self-determination for the
East Timorese, covertly manipulated the rivalry into civil war in order to weaken the proindependence movement. For Indonesia, an independent East Timor within its archipelago could
have inspired separatist sentiments from Indonesia’s other islands. Indonesia also feared a leftist
government existing in such close proximity. In August of 1975, UDT was given information by
the Indonesian government detailing an imminent power grab by FRETILIN. UDT responded by
staging a coup to take control of East Timor. When the violence ended, UDT had lost and had
been pushed into the western side of the island.14 Estimates place the loss of lives totaling
anywhere between two- and three-thousand Timorese.15 The Indonesian government did not
intend to limit itself to these clandestine activities to ensure East Timor’s integration, however.
As early as January 1975, evidence exists that Indonesia was considering direct military action.
In February on the island of Sumatra, the Indonesian military performed a rehearsal for a fullscale invasion of East Timor.16 Additionally, though it enjoyed the least amount of Timorese
support of the three major parties, APODETI drew most of its support from the Indonesian
government. Unlike FRETILIN and UDT, APODETI supported the integration of East Timor
with Indonesia. The Indonesian government, in turn, put resources into the hands of APODETI
in an effort to manipulate the self-determination of the East Timorese people.
13
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1975: The Invasion
Though the actual invasion of East Timor did not occur until December of 1975,
FRETILIN’s disposal of UDT during the internal infighting and assumed administration of East
Timor beginning in September spawned the first skirmishes between FRETILIN and the
Indonesian military. Portuguese administrators who had left during the civil war returned in this
period to aid in decolonization but were ultimately powerless and unsuccessful in providing any
sort of aid or structure to the events.17 Swamped by internal political conflicts as well as
bloodshed in its former African colonies, Portugal, in reality, had no control over what was
occurring in East Timor. With few obstacles, the Indonesian military proceeded to attack the
small island: on October 16th, the town of Balibó was captured, killing several Timorese as well
as five Australian journalists in the process; on November 28th, the town of Atabe fell to the
Indonesian military following two weeks of intensive bombing.18 FRETILIN, drawing on its
assumed power, unilaterally declared independence during this period of strife, perhaps hoping
to draw international attention and support.
Nine days later, the Indonesian military launched a full-scale invasion of the island.
Death toll estimates from December of 1975 to February of 1976 range from 55,000 to 100,000
people.19 The Indonesian military engaged in severe brutality, killing not only resistance fighters
but unarmed men, women, and children. East Timor’s ethnic Chinese minority was also
specifically targeted. When the Indonesian military forced FRETILIN from the city of Aileu, its
troops used machine guns to kill every remaining person in the city, sparing only those under the
age of four.20 This type of brutality was widespread throughout the territory.
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The Occupation
Full-scale war continued in East Timor until 1980, although Indonesia formally
announced its integration of East Timor in 1976.21 After four years of intensive fighting,
FRETILIN’s command structure was finally crippled. Small gangs of resistance fighters would
continue to operate from the hills and mountains and employ support networks through the
towns, but as an organization, FRETILIN struggled to survive.22 Divisions among those who
remained also inhibited the power of the organization.
Meanwhile, the Indonesian military continued its mass killings. In 1978, five-hundred
citizens were shot and killed after submitting their surrender. In 1981, four-hundred were killed,
nearly all of whom were women or small children. In 1983, “…sixty men, women, and children
were tied up and bulldozed to death.”23 By this time, nearly 120,000 people had been murdered
or had fallen victim to starvation by tactics enforced by the military. Many of these victims
consisted of the Chinese minority that had been present in the territory – of the 20,000, only a
few thousand remained by 1985.24
Throughout the occupation, Indonesia isolated East Timor, refusing to let any third party
onto the island. Therefore, Indonesia became the sole source of information about what was
occurring in East Timor. In the 1980s, Indonesia sought to portray East Timor as happily
integrated with the rest of the archipelago, the nuisance resistance crushed. Most of the
international community was willing to believe this fallacy. In 1982, it held “free elections”
where, unsurprisingly, ninety-nine percent of Timorese were said to have voted for President
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Suharto’s political party, Golkar.25 The Indonesian government followed this charade with
falsified reports claiming that only small amounts of violence and resistance continued to occur
on the island.
Though a ceasefire was negotiated in 1983 between the Indonesian military and
FRETILIN resistance, violence quickly returned to the island. Both parties accused each other
for the breakdown of the ceasefire: Indonesia cited the FRETILIN attack of Indonesian combat
engineers while FRETILIN pointed to the Indonesian killing of Timorese citizens during the
ceasefire. Regardless of the truth behind the breakdown of the ceasefire, the island was once
again engaged in conflict. The Indonesian military continued to neglect to direct their brutality
on only members of the resistance. In the village of Viqueque, all men were seized and shot to
death. Women and children were arrested, transported, and summarily executed in a nearby
village, bringing the death toll for this single event upwards of two hundred.26 With hostilities
between FRETILIN and the Indonesian military renewed, this type of violence again became
commonplace. Additionally, because of Indonesia’s isolation of East Timor, there was no chance
of third party intervention on behalf of the victimized Timorese.
Growing Resistance and the Dili Massacre
Toward the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, FRETILIN began to grow in strength. This
was largely due to the emergence of a youth movement and the lessening of control on the island
by Indonesia. Believing that East Timor was finally subdued, Indonesia moved away from
eliminating the resistance completely to attempting to rebuild the area from the damage that had
been done from the scorched earth policy of the Indonesian military. This lessening of control –
though East Timor arguably still retained characteristics of a war zone – allowed for greater
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movement of FRETILIN among the masses. Additionally, through Australian journalists and
resistance activists, information was smuggled out of the island and into the public realm.
On October 28th, 1991, a young Timorese resistance member was killed in an altercation
with the Indonesian military. The military had received information about a resistance meeting in
Motael Church and showed up at the meeting. During the confrontation, an integration activist
was killed and Sebastião Gomes, a young resistance member, was dragged out of the church by
Indonesian soldiers and shot to death. Due to rising tensions after this killing, the Portuguese
delegation scheduled to visit East Timor and engage in talks with FRETILIN and Indonesia was
cancelled. Despite this cancellation, several members of the delegation and news media remained
in the city of Dili. On November 12th, the resistance movement held a funeral ceremony in
memory of the murdered man. Several thousand attended and during the march from church to
cemetery, pulled out pro-independence banners and signs. This was the most visible protest of
Indonesian occupation in Timorese history. The protest was orderly and peaceful, with banners
and songs as the main medium of displaying discontent.
Indonesian soldiers responded to this demonstration by open firing into the crowd of
unarmed men, women, and children. Those that were lightly injured in the following chaos were
later bayoneted to death, not only in the protest area but also in their homes where they had
returned to hide hours after the event.27 At least two-hundred people were killed, with twohundred and fifty more missing. In its usual fashion, Indonesia attempted to cover up the extent
of the violence, claiming that only approximately nineteen people died in the skirmish.
Fortunately for the Timorese people, however, the journalists who had originally arrived
in East Timor to document the Portuguese delegation were present at the march and taped the
violence. Upon release, these tapes put East Timor on the forefront of international attention.
27
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Finally, the United States, Australia, and other international players were forced to choose
humanitarianism over economic concerns. Evidence of the cruelty of the Indonesian military had
sponsored great public support for East Timor’s independence, especially in Australia. This
support was the turning point for the history of East Timor, as it enabled the United Nations to
act on behalf of East Timor.
Independence
In August of 1999, the United Nations sponsored a referendum giving Timorese the
chance to vote for independence or integration with Indonesia, finally fulfilling international
law’s promise of self-determination that had been denied in East Timor since 1975. In the
months leading up to this referendum, Indonesian brutality skyrocketed. In February, lieutenantcolonel Yahyat Sudrajad ordered the killing of all pro-independence leaders and their families.
The following month, the Indonesian-appointed governor Abilio Soares ordered the killing of all
nuns and priests in the territory.28 As the ballot date approached, Indonesian militias sought to
destabilize the process. On the day of the vote, two men were decapitated and their heads were
put on display in a public Timorese center to intimidate would-be voters.29 The actions of the
militias were ultimately futile, however: 98.6% of registered Timorese voters visited polling
centers that day.30
Despite all of violence and intimidation leading up to the vote, seventy-nine percent of
Timorese voted for independence in the referendum. Following this vote, Indonesian militias
rampaged. Hundreds of thousands of people were forcibly deported or fled the violence. At least
one thousand citizens were murdered and up to eighty percent of homes in East Timor were
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destroyed.31 In the days following the vote, targeted killings of pro-independence activists, U.N.
officials and volunteers, and journalists continued. Women who fled to seek sanctuary from the
violence in Fohoren Nossa Senhora do Rosario Church were forcibly removed and taken to a
police station, where they were beaten, stripped, burned with cigarettes, and sexually harassed.32
As one journalist described the events, this “…was ethnic cleansing Indonesia-style.”33
Weeks later, Indonesia bowed to international pressure and allowed the U.N. to send a
multinational peacekeeping force, called the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET),
into East Timor to restore order to the area. INTERFET was able to establish order as well as a
temporary democratic government. On May 20, 2002, it officially handed responsibility over to
the new, independent state of Timor-Leste. After nearly thirty years of violence and denial of
self-determination, the Timorese people finally triumphed over Indonesia. Questions still remain,
however, as to why it took decades for international actors to support the cause for Timorese
self-determination and decry the brutality of the Indonesian military.
US-Timor Relations
Prior to the decolonization of Portuguese Timor, the United States was already
extensively involved with Indonesia. Following the conclusion of World War II, relations
between the United States and the Soviet Union declined into a tense ideological conflict
described today as the Cold War. For decades, the two superpowers were in constant
competition, with the U.S. seeking to stop the spread of the communist ideology and with both
superpowers attempting to gain military superiority over one another. The relationship between
the U.S. and Indonesia developed as a result of this conflict. U.S. officials viewed Southeast Asia
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as a region rich with mineral wealth and investment opportunities but also as a weak region
particularly vulnerable to the influence of the U.S.S.R.34 Just as with Vietnam and Laos, the U.S.
government aimed to stop communism from infiltrating Indonesia at all costs. Through its
alliance with Indonesia, the U.S. was able to remove any influence from the U.S.S.R.
Following the end of Dutch colonial rule over Indonesia, a government emerged under
President Sukarno that was extremely nationalistic, neutral, and anti-imperialistic. As this
combination of ideals was clearly not compatible with U.S. intentions regarding the region, the
U.S. began to support a rebellious movement that was growing within the military. Ultimately, in
the mid-1960s, General Suharto of the Indonesian military led his U.S.-armed militia against the
Sukarno government and established the New Order regime that would control Indonesia until
1999. Anywhere from 500,000 people to greater than one million people were murdered in this
takeover, in particular those belonging to the Indonesian Communist Party and those loosely
related to it, like participants in labor unions and women’s groups.35 The U.S. support of this
massacre, particularly its focus on Cold War goals in neglect of human rights, would repeat itself
in the East Timor crisis. As 1975 approached, a critical year in the history of East Timor, the
U.S. had already allied itself with Indonesia at great human cost.
The new government of Portugal had announced its intentions to decolonize all overseas
assets immediately after its ascent to power in 1974. The arrangement of the process of selfdetermination had yet to be determined by the Portuguese in 1975, yet the future of the small
colony was already being decided elsewhere by the Suharto regime. In a meeting on July 5th
between Suharto and U.S. President Gerald Ford, Suharto introduced the issue of decolonization.
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After assuring President Ford that Indonesia fully supported self-determination for the Timorese
people, he proceeded to describe the situation wholly inaccurately:
“The problem is that those who want independence are those who are Communist-influenced.
Those wanting Indonesian integration are being subjected to heavy pressure by those who are
almost Communists. The Communist elements practically sabotaged the recent meeting in
Macao.”36

This exaggeration of FRETILIN, the main political party of the island that supported
independence, as “Communist-influenced” aligned the U.S. against them. Though Marxist
rhetoric was used by FRETILIN often, their political philosophy was distinct from that of the
Communist Party and they had no diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. This distinction was of
little importance to Indonesia, which had already recognized that Timorese independence could
increase separatist sentiment within the archipelago.37 At this point in time, the easiest way to
ensure U.S. aid was through red fear. This is precisely the tactic that the Indonesian government
used. Publicly, however, the Indonesian government claimed to be seeking to reunite two
ethnically similar peoples divided by the cruelties of colonization.38
As the months progressed, Indonesian intentions involving East Timor became clear:
despite Portugal’s attempts to negotiate new leadership in East Timor, Suharto would not
cooperate with this plan. Instead, he sponsored the training of militias and military exercises on
the island to prepare for invasion.39 Though the U.S. would later deny any knowledge of these
actions, documents remain showing CIA observation of military activity in the area, such as the
acknowledgement of the entrance of two Indonesian special force groups into Timor in
September.40The attitude of top-level officials to this growing tension was exceeding cavalier. As
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a State Department official recalled, when questioned about the matter, General Scowcroft,
President Ford’s National Security Adviser, dismissed the idea of supporting the Timorese
because “…it made no sense to antagonize the Indonesians…East Timor was not a viable
entity.”41 Similarly, President Ford declared that the U.S. had “no interests in East Timor” and
should “follow Indonesia’s lead on the issue.”42 Considering that the Suharto government
referenced killed nearly one million innocent people on its rise to power and the majority of
Timorese supported the opposing independence party, FRETILIN, in East Timor and not
integration, it is an easy conclusion to draw that the integration of the island would not be a
peaceful one.
A crucial turning point in the relations between Indonesia and East Timor came with
FRETILIN’s victory over UDT and APODETI and subsequent declaration of the independence
of East Timor on November 28th, 1975. Following this declaration, Indonesia committed to
invasion of the island. Before it did, however, a meeting was convened by President Suharto to
speak with President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger. The meeting commenced on
December 6th, one day before the full-scale invasion of East Timor took place. Once again,
Suharto phrased his intention to integrate East Timor as a result of Indonesia’s concern for the
“security, tranquility, and peace of Asia” and asked them for “...understanding if we deem it
necessary to take rapid or drastic action.” President Ford replied, “We will understand and will
not press you on the issue. We understand the problem and the intentions you have.” Sensing the
legal issues that would arise with Indonesian use of U.S. supplied weaponry, a clear violation of
the terms with which the weapons were supplied, Kissinger added that Suharto should wait to
commence action until the two men returned to the U.S., as it would allow them to “…influence
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the reaction in America.”43 Through this conversation, Kissinger and Ford gave Suharto approval
to proceed in invading East Timor.
This approval came the day after Ford’s receipt of a desperate letter from FRETILIN
describing the false charges Indonesia had waged against it, including that the people of East
Timor desired Indonesian integration. The letter perceptively concluded, “My government
believes these baseless charges are a prelude to open warfare.”44 Despite this evidence, the U.S.
chose to believe the assessment of the situation proposed by Indonesia: that FRETILIN was a
Communist-influenced government enforcing its will against the desires of the people.
The approval was also a violation of U.S. law. As Kissinger alluded to in the
conversation with Suharto, the U.S. had supplied nearly 90% of Indonesia’s existing military
equipment through the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP), a program designed to provide
equipment only for economic and social development.45 This equipment could specifically only
be used for these developmental uses or for the defense of a country. As was seen with the
Cyprus crisis and Turkey’s unauthorized use of U.S. arms, this violation was a serious offense.
It was impossible to deny the use of U.S. arms in the Indonesian invasion. As the State
Department summarized, “There is no doubt U.S. Military Assistance Program equipment was
used, and we could be in for part of the blame if the operation is not a quick success.”46
Congressmen recognized this violation of MAP equipment and following the invasion, a sixmonth suspension of U.S. arms was imposed where no new orders were taken. However, existing
orders, including for war materials designated to crush Timorese rebellion to the occupation,
continued to be filled. Between the invasion and 1979, Indonesia received over $178 million in
43
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U.S. military aid.47 Obviously, this Congressional resolution against Indonesia was wholly
ineffective, just as Ford and Kissinger had intended.
Throughout the decades of Indonesian occupation, individual Congressmen and third
party organizations attempted to enact change to the U.S. policy supporting Indonesia. In order
to combat this opposition, successive administrations sought to limit the information about the
East Timor crisis that came into the hands of the legislature and the public. Foreign policy goals
supporting Indonesia dictated that public opinion should be controlled. In 1976, the National
Security Council even went as far as to plan to subvert a potential Congressional decision
limiting or ceasing military arms supply to Indonesia. In a memorandum dated February 18th,
Thomas Barnes detailed potential plans of action, including manufacturing weapons in other
countries under U.S. license, coproducing weapons in Indonesia, or selling the weapons through
“straight commercial sale.” Barnes indicates specifically that helicopters and M-16 rifles would
be good objects for coproduction.48 Nowhere within these documents is there an indication of
administrative intent to listen to the voice of representatives or the public realm.
The unauthorized use of arms during the 1975 invasion was the first issue to sponsor
resistance against U.S. official policy. One of the first to stand up for East Timor was
Representative Tom Harkin of Iowa, who introduced an amendment in 1976 to eliminate $19.4
million dollars of military aid to Indonesia. After the failure of the amendment, Harkin frankly
reflected: “It is a shock…to see how utterly expendable human rights considerations are in our
dealings with the government of Indonesia.”49 The lack of Congressional support for such an
amendment should not come as a surprise, however. Successive administrations sought to limit
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the information provided to Congressmen. In 1977, Congressman Fraser made repeated requests
for the release of the memorandum of conversation from December 6th of 1975, where Ford and
Kissinger had given U.S. approval for the Indonesian invasion. Mike Armacost of the National
Security Council soundly disapproved of giving Fraser this information, stating that “…if he gets
hold of it, this will become a public issue” which would also hinder relations with Indonesia.50
Based upon this reasoning, the National Security Council withheld information from publicly
elected officials.
As far as concerns the media, the East Timor question was wholly invisible to the average
U.S. citizen during this time. Just as the administration limited information available to the
legislature, even less information was granted to the public. East Timor, as only a fraction of a
small island somewhere in the Indonesian archipelago, did not sponsor unique interest to the
American media. Indonesian silencing of the Timorese as well as the U.S. government’s
withholding of critical information also worked against Timorese hoping to gain U.S. support. In
1975, The New York Times printed six columns concerning East Timor. In 1976, annual coverage
dropped to half a column.51 In 1977, there was no mention of East Timor.52 Based on its unique
situation of power and influence over Indonesia, the U.S. was one of few countries with the
capacity to sponsor change in the Timor situation. Unfortunately, the U.S. government showed
no desire to support the Timorese people and, through censorship of information, ensured that
the American public had little idea of what was truly happening in East Timor.
Hopes for an increased U.S. role in policing the Indonesian occupation of East Timor
rose with the beginning of the Jimmy Carter presidency. Carter’s commitment to promoting
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human rights, however, ultimately did not extend to East Timor. Though some punitive measures
were taken, they were rarely enforced and usually disproportionate to the crimes committed. One
example of this was the previously discussed six-month probationary period placed on the sale of
U.S. weapons to Indonesia. Just as happened in the Ford Administration, during the Carter
Administration documents related to East Timor continuously reference the importance of
Indonesia to the U.S.: its position in Southeast Asia, large size and population, high amount of
U.S. investment, and abundant natural resources.
The new leadership of President Carter certainly did little to change the beliefs of the
National Security Council. In 1977, the Council drafted a memorandum to be sent to the
President requesting that he “ease up on the human rights pressures directed at Indonesia,” the
extent of these pressures being a slow response to Indonesian requests for aid. The National
Security Council advised that:
“The Department of State should be instructed to expedite various Indonesian requests in view of
recent evidence of its intent to move positively on the human rights question. In addition, we
should seek to persuade Congressman Fraser to cease hearings on the Timor question. The
Indonesian decision is irreversible. The USG has accepted it. Continued Congressional hearings
are regarded as unwarranted and mischievous interference in their domestic affairs.”53

Again, the National Security Council mentions Congressman Fraser’s attempts to bring national
attention to the East Timor issue and disparages these attempts. Additionally, this memorandum
introduces a new argument against getting the U.S. involved into East Timor: East Timor, by this
point, was officially integrated into Indonesia per the Indonesian government and had been
accepted as a de facto part of Indonesia by the previous U.S. government administration.
Because of this integration, any issues surrounding East Timor were now internal issues of
Indonesia and did not merit U.S. involvement. Additionally, though it would continue to commit
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mass violence against the Timorese, the Indonesian government claimed that it would improve
human rights conditions in East Timor.
While the U.S. government withheld much of the information surrounding East Timor
from the public and legislature, some information was released. These reports, however, often
presented manipulated or obviously untrue statistics. In the Congressional hearings on East
Timor, Robert Oakley, a senior official of the Carter Administration, testified, “We would judge
that the number of total casualties, civilian, military, everything else, is probably under 10,000.”
He also described the difficult nature of estimating the death toll given that no hard figures
existed. This stands blatantly in contrast to the report the Administration had received from the
Catholic Church concerning the events from August 1975 to March 1976. As Catholicism was
the most prominent religion within East Timor, the Church officials on the island were uniquely
positioned to record the results of the Indonesian invasion. The report that the Church sent at the
end of 1976 stated that within these eight months, as many as 100,000 people had been killed.54
The U.S. government, however, was determined to continue in ignorance, believing only the
reports submitted directly to them from the Indonesian government. Even the U.S. Human Rights
Report, drafted by the State Department, neglected East Timor. In 1977, East Timor was never
mentioned. In 1978, the report claimed that following the incorporation of East Timor into
Indonesia, “The Indonesian Government withdrew and disciplined offending units guilty of
individual excesses [during the invasion], but most of the human losses in East Timor appear to
have occurred prior to Indonesia’s intervention.”55 It was true that the human losses had actually
begun with civil war between the political parties in East Timor in the year prior to the invasion.
The report neglects the fact that through covert missions, Indonesia exacerbated the tensions
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between these parties to increase violence and dissent in the community. Months before
Indonesian troops committed the full-scale invasion of Timor, smaller military conflicts had
taken place. While the months including and immediately following the invasion consisted of the
greatest amount of bloodshed, by 1978 Indonesia still faced resistance in East Timor and reacted
to it with more violence. By no means was East Timor the peaceful picture of accepted
integration that various government bodies implied through their official documents and
announcements.
In the years following the initial invasion, the Indonesian government sponsored an
amnesty program for the Timorese that had fled into the hilly countryside to avoid the violence
or continue to sponsor FRETILIN resistance. A September 1978 report described the process:
once a citizen had accepted amnesty, they were placed in a “relocation area” for three months or
more and then were permanently resettled per Indonesian instruction. During an ambassador’s
visit to East Timor, they watched people who had received amnesty the day before being given
clothing and food. The ambassador noted in his report that this was likely “…a show obviously
set up for our benefit, but we have no reason to believe that this is not the usual procedure.”56 On
the contrary, per the Suharto regime’s violent and brutal history, the U.S. should have had
suspicion that this was not the typical process. Additionally, considering East Timor’s poor
infrastructure and lack of food, the conditions of “relocation camps” were dubious as well.
Though the U.S. had as of yet done very little to improve the conditions in East Timor,
during the Carter Administration it began pressing the Indonesian government to grant
permission for third party welfare organizations to enter the island. During a meeting between
Vice President Walter Mondale and President Suharto, Mondale requested that the Catholic
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Relief Services (CRS), an international humanitarian agency of the Catholic Church, or similar
organization be allowed into East Timor. Suharto responded negatively, claiming that “negative
attitude [existed] toward that organization in East Timor” and it would have negative effects on
the situation.57 With approximately ninety-eight percent of East Timorese subscribing to the
Catholic religion, it is unclear what “negative attitude” the citizens would have toward the CRS.
At any rate, Suharto used this reason to limit the entry of any other organization in East Timor.
This issue was raised once again in a 1978 ambassador visit with Indonesian Foreign
Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja. Just as President Suharto had done two years earlier, Mochtar
refused the idea of private organizations coming into East Timor. He showed particular disdain
for the International Red Cross, as their entry into the island had been part of the resolution that
FRETILIN was attempting to introduce into the United Nations. Ultimately, Mochtar felt outside
aid “…could best be channeled through the GOI or the Indonesian Red Cross.”58 In summarizing
the Indonesian feelings toward this matter, U.S. Ambassador Edward Masters stated that since
the Indonesian government had control over the island, “…they will not want to imply that they
have to call in foreign personnel to meet their basic needs…for a time at least the GOI will
probably insist that it be Indonesians who are in direct contact with Timorese…” 59 Missing from
this document is the obvious analysis that if the Indonesian government was the sole party able
to interact with the Timorese, it meant that the Indonesians could act as they pleased with no
worry of international response or critique. Without third party inclusion, the only information
coming out of East Timor besides that dictated by the Indonesian government was extremely
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minimal. By isolating East Timor, Indonesia ensured that it had complete authority over the
island and also that it was not answerable for its actions there to any other entity. Despite this,
the U.S. government continued to believe the information provided by Indonesia and ignore the
occasional report smuggled out of the island by FRETILIN supporters or Australian media.
U.S. support of Indonesia also extended into the United Nations. For the first few years
after the Indonesian invasion, FRETILIN proposed resolutions for the General Assembly to
adopt, stating that their right to self-determination had been violated and also listing the human
rights violations that Indonesia had committed in their occupation. In 1977, FRETILIN severely
censored their proposed resolution in the hopes that by omitting the more grisly details, they
would gain the support of the U.S. Though 1977 brought the support of Egypt and Saudi Arabia,
the U.S., Australia, and all ASEAN states remained supportive of Indonesia. Overall, the
resolution was viewed as “…marginally better than the one we [the U.S. delegation] voted
against last December, in that it omits reference to Indonesia’s military intervention and does not
call on Indonesia to withdraw its forces from the territory.” 60 Without the support of major
players in the U.N. such as the U.S. and Australia, FRETILIN could not secure the aid of the
U.N. Not only did the U.N. refuse to help the Timorese achieve self-determination, but it would
be several years before East Timor made it onto the agenda of the Human Rights Commission.
During the 1980s, violence increased in East Timor after a swell of activity by
FRETILIN. The foreign policy approach of the U.S. to East Timor, however, did not change.
This lack of response was not due to a lack of information about the rising tensions within East
Timor. In 1983, a revealing report from the Jakarta Embassy detailed the conditions within East
Timor: “…there have been house to house searches for FRETILIN supporters and
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weapons…new troops have been introduced…one estimate spoke of up to ten thousand new
soldiers. Allegedly, all access to East Timor has been closed.”61 The report clearly describes the
escalation of military force within the island through a renewed push to eliminate all FRETILIN
supporters. After the initial invasion of the island, FRETILIN had managed to continue its
resistance activities through small networks of supporters within villages and towns. A large
proportion of the supporters also fled to the hills on the island, making it impossible for the
Indonesian army to capture them. Due to this clandestine nature of the resistance, the searches
performed by the army often violated privacy rights of Timorese citizens and endorsed the use of
torture for information leading to more supporters.
The forced relocation of Timorese who accepted amnesty increased during the early
1980s as well. The same 1983 embassy report describing the unwarranted house searches
references this trend with concern: “Without knowing where Timorese have been moved, it is
difficult to speculate about their conditions, but based on past performance, _____ it likely that
preparations, including housing and places to plant, may be inadequate.”62 Alluding to the
exclusion of any third party in East Timor, the report acknowledges that the true conditions of
the relocation camps may not be as the Indonesian government described them. Additionally, the
report shows that the U.S. government did have a degree of cognizance of the human rights
abuses that were taking place in East Timor. Specifically, the phrase “based on past
performance” indicates that not only was the U.S. concerned about current poor treatment of the
Timorese, but also that they were aware or had factual knowledge concerning past treatment.
Importantly, despite U.S. doubt regarding Indonesian information pertaining to the violence and
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related events on the island, the U.S. did not take action. Instead, the U.S. continued its policy of
supporting Indonesia in its endeavors to complete the integration of the island and destruction of
FRETILIN while mildly pressing for third party intervention.
Throughout the 1980s, U.S. Congressmen continued to attempt to pressure the executive
branch to change its policy on East Timor. In 1982, 102 Congressmen requested a more in-depth
look at the East Timor policy. Later that year, seventy-five of these Congressmen drafted a letter
to President Ronald Reagan expressing their concerns about the “Timor tragedy.” In 1988, 182
Representatives requested that the administration address human rights issues in East Timor.63
This growing Congressional concern was fueled by human rights watch organizations and East
Timor lobbyist groups. Unfortunately, neither the Reagan nor the Bush Administrations
effectively responded to these pleas to reassess the East Timor policy. Instead, military
assistance to Indonesia continued to increase.
Noticeable change in U.S. policy finally occurred when President Bill Clinton took office
in the 1990s. Like the Carter Administration, the Clinton Administration claimed a commitment
to promoting human rights throughout the world. Unlike the Carter Administration, however, the
Clinton Administration assumed office following the horrific Dili Massacre, an event that had
brought much negative international attention onto Indonesia. Videotapes of the funeral
procession that turned into a peaceful protest against Indonesian occupation and the Indonesian
army’s open fire into the crowd of unarmed citizens made it out of the island and created a media
firestorm. This event, while tragic, allowed the U.S. to show public disapproval of Indonesia’s
actions. Other worldwide events also helped to create the conditions necessary for international
intervention. One of the most important of these was the dissolution of the Soviet Union. With
this, red fear ceased to be a motivating factor for supporting Indonesia. Indonesia was no longer
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the last line of defense of democracy in a part of the world viewed in danger of falling to
communism. Additionally, the liberation of various peoples under the Soviet Union brought
unique attention to the Timorese and their dilemma. Finally, by this point in time, the Persian
Gulf War had commenced. The conflict began with Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait.
Undeniable parallels existed between the Gulf War conflict and East Timor’s integration, with
Saddam Hussein at one point even justifying his annexation of Kuwait by referencing East
Timor.64 By defending the right of self-determination for the people of Kuwait by military
means, the U.S. made it less possible to continue to ignore this principle as concerned East
Timor.
In 1993, the U.S. co-sponsored a resolution in the U.N. Human Rights Commission that
was critical of Indonesia’s human rights record in East Timor. Specifically, this resolution
looked to the Dili Massacre and its aftermath. Resistance supporters that survived the shooting
were given long prison sentences but the soldiers who, unprovoked, shot into the crowd and
killed nearly three-hundred unarmed people, were simply reassigned or given an extremely light
punishment.
Though the U.S. did sponsor this critical resolution, it did not by any means seek to limit
its relationship with Indonesia. While the fall of the Soviet Union meant that Indonesia was no
longer needed as a bastion of democracy in an uncertain area of the world, the abundant natural
resources and U.S. investment into Indonesia meant that alliance was still critical. Because of
this, though the U.S. increased its pressure on Indonesia to improve human rights conditions in
East Timor, it did not enforce this pressure with any sort of ultimatum or incentive. As a State
Department telegram in 1993 summarized:
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“The current emphasis of U.S. efforts is to press the Indonesians A) to fully account for those still
missing in east Timor, B) to reduce the harsh sentences given civilian demonstrators compared
with the comparatively light sentences given members of the military involved and C) to grant
greater international access to East Timor.” 65

The U.S. government recognized the lack of access to East Timor as a potential danger for the
human rights conditions of the Timorese people. This new policy is a clear reaction to the Dili
Massacre, specifying that the resistance members’ punishments should be reduced. Notably, the
U.S. did not ask that the soldiers involved in the shootings receive harsher, more appropriate
sentences. Additionally, after President Suharto delivered a public expression of apology for the
actions taken by the Indonesian military in Dili, U.S. officials decreased their efforts to achieve
these new goals for East Timor.
The U.S. efforts during the Clinton Administration did not extend to supporting
independence for East Timor. It did, however, begin to recognize the impossibility of East
Timor’s peaceful integration with Indonesia. A telegram from the U.S. embassy in Jakarta in
1993 detailed the “smoldering resentment” of the Timorese toward the Indonesian military’s
“omnipresence…paternalism, corruption and domination of the local economy as well as their
cruelty.” 66 With this sentiment persistent on the island, peaceful integration was extremely
unlikely. As the telegram succinctly noted, “Integration will never be palatable as long as it is
demanded at gunpoint.”67 For twenty years, the Indonesian army had kidnapped and murdered
Timorese citizens suspected of supporting the resistance. Unsurprisingly, the brutality that the
Indonesians showed to the Timorese did not sponsor support or acceptance of integration.
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Unfortunately, this telegram did not go as far as to propose a secondary plan of action for
East Timor. The State Department did, however, rule out independence as a viable future of East
Timor, citing its underdeveloped economy and structure. Despite East Timor’s declaration of
independence prior to the invasion, a clear indication of the will of the people, the U.S. did not
believe independence should be granted. With these paternalistic views, the U.S. instead
attempted to ease integration by attempting to improve the relations between East Timor and
Indonesia.
With growing international concern over human rights relations and an increase in
information coming out of East Timor, the U.N. began to take a more active interest in the future
of the island. After a severe economic decline in 1997 and 1998, coupled with growing political
opposition, President Suharto was forced to resign from Indonesian government. Suharto’s fall
allowed for the U.N. to sponsor an agreement between the new Indonesian government and
Portugal to allow for the East Timorese to vote for their independence. After a clear vote for
independence, Indonesian militias reacted with extreme violence, destroying most of the
infrastructure of East Timor as well as killing and displacing many thousand Timorese. Per the
this increase in activity by the U.N., the U.S. policy towards East Timor became more
supportive. In a public statement during 1999, President Clinton declared that “…nobody is
going to want to continue to invest [into Indonesia] if they are allowing this sort of travesty to go
on.”68 In this statement, Clinton referenced not only the importance of U.S. investment into
Indonesia for their economy, but also the ability of the U.S. to hinder Indonesia’s acquisition of
IMF and World Bank loans. Under U.S. influence, the IMF and World Bank ultimately did
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suspend their programs of aid to Indonesia in what was one of the key factors in Indonesia
allowing an international peacekeeping force onto the island to establish order.
U.S. actions in 1999 and the years following show how much influence the U.S. wielded
over the Indonesia-East Timor crisis. Had the U.S. acted differently and refused support for
Indonesia’s initial invasion in 1975, it is likely that East Timor would have peaceably developed
into an independent republic per Portugal’s original plans. Through its close alliance with
Indonesia, the U.S. supplied nearly all military weaponry and also supported the Indonesian
economy with large investments. These contributions to Indonesia gave the U.S. a unique place
of influence over the Suharto government that could have been used at any point to restrain
Indonesia.69 Additionally, without U.S. interference, President Suharto and the New Order
regime would have been unable to assume power.
Throughout the East Timor crisis, U.S. government officials provided many different
reasons for their continued support of Indonesia. The U.S. had concerns for their financial
investments. Its support of Indonesia was also directly related to the Cold War. The U.S. sought
to preserve and strengthen Indonesia so it would not fall to the Soviet Union. Per the domino
theory, many believed that if Indonesia fell to communism, the surrounding East Asian states
would as well. Because of this, the U.S. wished to strengthen their alliance with Indonesia,
something that resisting Indonesia’s plan to integrate East Timor surely would not do. However,
at this point in time, the Suharto Indonesian government was too weak to take any punitive
actions towards the U.S. It is unlikely that there would have been any economic repercussions
had the U.S. pressured Indonesia not to invade East Timor. 70
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The U.S. preserved its support of Indonesia’s invasion by preventing information
surrounding the events secret from the public and from most government officials. Instead of
investigating reports that were smuggled directly out of East Timor by Church officials or
Australian press, the U.S. chose to believe the clearly edited reports given by the Indonesian
government. As historian Chomsky accuses:
“At every crucial point, the US government, with the press trailing loyally in its wake, has denied
or concealed the atrocities committed by its Indonesian ally and has taken the position that
whatever minor improper actions may have occurred in the past, it is now a matter of history and
no useful purpose is served by questioning Indonesian control of East Timor.”71

By continuing to supply arms to Indonesia and refusing to apply pressure on the East Timor
situation, the U.S. perpetuated the subjugation of the Timorese people. As several government
documents have shown, the U.S. was aware of human rights violations taking place but chose to
view the situation as an internal issue of Indonesia and remain ignorant to the truth of the
situation.
The Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (CAVR) was
established in 2001 to gather information on what truly occurred during the years of Indonesian
occupation in East Timor. Prior to its dissolution, CAVR published a report, Chega!, which
contains detailed descriptions of Indonesian violations of human rights principles, international
involvement, and many statistics concerning the occupation. In discussing the role of the U.S. in
the crisis of East Timor, Chega! concluded:
“…the support given by the United States to Indonesia was crucial to the invasion and continued
occupation of Timor-Leste. This was so not only because weapons and equipment purchased
from the United States played a significant role in Indonesian military operations in Timor, but
also because it never used its unique position of power and influence to counsel its Indonesian
ally against embarking on an illegal course of action.”72
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The “unique position of power and influence” of the U.S. over Indonesia is difficult to argue.
Economically, the U.S. controlled millions of dollars of investments into Indonesia and also had
the ability to manipulate IMF and World Bank action. Militarily, the U.S. supplied
approximately ninety percent of the weaponry used to subjugate East Timor. Without the support
of the government that supplied these things, Indonesia would have been unable to control East
Timor and deny its people self-determination. Had the U.S. been more concerned with the
human rights of the Timorese and refused President Suharto’s invasion proposal in 1975, thirty
years of occupation – brutal for the Timorese and unsuccessful for Indonesia – would have been
avoided.
Australia-Timor Relations
The U.S. was not the only country whose actions, or lack thereof, perpetuated the
subjugation of the East Timorese people. Despite Australia’s proximity to Timor, its political
policy concerning the struggle for Timorese independence and Indonesia’s occupation of the area
clearly reflected that of the United States. Like the U.S., Australia used an anticommunism
rationale to justify the occupation. As Australian anticommunist activist B.A. Santamaria
described, “…a government dominated by the Fretilin would extend the tentacles of Communist
subversion to Australia’s doorstep.”73 Australia also sought to avoid confrontation with
Indonesia because it was, with the help of U.S. military aid, a powerful militarized neighbor.
Support of this kind was viewed as crucial.
Though East Timor’s proximity to Australia caused alarm for those who feared a
FRETILIN rise to power, it presented another opportunity for Indonesia to coerce Australian
support in its occupation of East Timor. For years, the maritime boundary between East Timor
and Australia had been debated. The sea bed located between the two islands contained several
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mineral, oil, and gas deposits. Though the exact extent of these deposits was unknown in the
1970s, Australia hoped to gain a favorable boundary that enabled it to acquire some of these
deposits. As soon as Indonesia expressed a desire to integrate East Timor, and to have
Australia’s support in the matter, the Australian government recognized that this future could
have great economic benefit for them. Namely, Australia believed that it could receive a more
beneficial maritime boundary through negotiations with Indonesia than negotiations with East
Timor. As a telegram from Richard Woolcott, Australian ambassador to Indonesia, in August of
1975 states:
“We are all aware of the Australian defence interest in the Portuguese Timor situation but I
wonder whether the Department has ascertained the interest of the Minister of the Department of
Minerals and Energy in the Timor situation. It would seem to me that this Department might well
have an interest in closing the present gap in the agreed sea border and this could be much more
readily negotiated with Indonesia by closing the present gap than with Portugal or an independent
Portuguese Timor.”74

Even before the invasion of 1975, top officials in Australia’s government recognized the
potential economic benefit of supporting Indonesia as concerned the maritime boundary. Oil
lobbyists and others with a stake in the outcome of determination of the maritime boundary made
their opinions clear to the Australian government as well.
Indonesia was not unaware of the issue of this maritime boundary and used the issue to
its advantage. As an oil-rich state itself, Indonesia’s need for the undetermined resource deposits
in the Timor Gap was negligible. What Indonesia needed was Australia’s affirmation of their
integration of East Timor. In 1979, Indonesia renewed negotiations for the Timor Gap Treaty
with Australia, under one condition: Australia must recognize officially Indonesia’s sovereignty
over East Timor. Faced with this choice, Australia chose to recognize Indonesia’s integration of
East Timor and received out of this an extremely favorable treaty. In this deal, East Timor lost
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hope of a potential savoir. Without consent, it was also forced to give up land and resources
through the Timor Gap Treaty.
Just as in the U.S., media and government misinformation was found throughout the
occupation period in Australia. In Australia, however, the media outlets concerned were typically
conservative forces. News Weekly, a publication founded by Santamaria, went as far as to
directly attack FRETILIN in 1975, attributing horrors like “the beheading of babies and small
children” and other mass murders to the resistance group. 75 Decades later, this misinformation
had not subsided. In 1995, Quadrant published an article stating, “…there is little evidence that
the majority of East Timorese want independence…The majority who have benefited greatly
from very large Indonesian expenditure on roads and other infrastructure…are by all
disinterested accounts not dissatisfied.”76 Just four years later, nearly eighty percent of Timorese,
despite the risk to their safety, voted for independence. Additionally, articles like this gave the
impression that Indonesia had improved upon infrastructure and health in East Timor for the
benefit of Timorese. In reality, roads were constructed for easier movement of Indonesian troops
throughout the island. Food manufacturing equipment and crop fields were simply restored, as
Indonesian troops had purposefully destroyed these in an attempt to starve the Timorese into
submission in the late 1970s. Despite these facts, many facets of the conservative media, in an
attempt to support Australia’s alliance with Indonesia, continued to publish articles that
misconstrued what was really happening in East Timor.
Though close proximity to Indonesia had provided many reasons for the national government
to support Indonesia, it made awareness of the events occurring in East Timor much harder to
hide from the general population. Attempts to keep the public ignorant, as displayed in
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publications like News Weekly and Quadrant, were ultimately unsuccessful. Unlike within the
United States, a large public backlash against the national government’s support of Indonesia
formed. Denis Freney of the Communist Party of Australia (C.P.A.) established the Campaign
for an Independent East Timor (C.I.E.T.), an organization that was extremely active in retrieving
information from East Timor and distributing it to the Australian people, much to the displeasure
of the national government. C.I.E.T. smuggled six radio transceivers to FRETILIN in 1975 and
after these were destroyed by Indonesian troops, continued to sponsor radio transmissions
through the help of wharf laborers, Communist activists, and the Timorese themselves. The
federal police sought to end these transmissions, leading to what activists later described as
“years of wild emu chases through the outback”, for the “crime” of informing the public what
was truly occurring in East Timor.77
In addition to the efforts of C.I.E.T. were the small group of journalists who were able to
smuggle themselves into East Timor over years of the occupation. In October of 1978, Canberra
Times carried the story of a group of Australians who had entered Dili harbor in East Timor.
They described the harbor as full of “frigates, patrol boats, barges crammed with Indonesian
soldiers, and many aircraft and helicopters” and “were left without doubts that Dili was still a
war zone.”78 Reports like these sponsored widespread grassroots support within Australia. The
Australian Labor Party, unions, and independent religious organizations also joined together with
the public to support the Timorese cause.
Under this extensive public and organizational support of the Timorese, eventually the
government was unable to sustain their support for Indonesia. From 1975 through 1998,
Australia had given small tokens of recognition to this support base, such as signing the U.N.
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resolution in 1975 that supported East Timor’s right to self-determination. At the same time,
however, Australia fought to have references to the brutality of the Indonesian military and the
call for their immediate withdrawal removed from the resolution.79 Though Australia was
ultimately unsuccessful in that goal, this process shows how even Australia’s occasional support
for the Timorese was dominated by its larger goal of a continued alliance with Indonesia. In
1999, just as in the U.S., major changes came to Australia’s foreign policy with Indonesia.
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer authorized direct consultations with the East Timorese and
called for the release of prominent resistance leader Xanana Gusmão. Prime Minister John
Howard supported Downer in this, believing that through direct consultation, Australia could
help secure autonomy for East Timor within Indonesia. This plan, however, simply reignited the
independence movement within East Timor and its supporters within Australia.80 U.N. actions
were finally taken in 1999 and the years following, with Australia often at their forefront.
Ultimately, Australia led the International Force in East Timor, protecting the U.N.-mandated
referendum on independence and helping to ensure that the results of this vote were followed by
Indonesia.
Though Australia did not enjoy the particularly great position of influence over Indonesia
that the U.S. did, the government’s actions not only supported the illegal occupation of Indonesia
but at times completely ignored the call of its citizens to support the East Timorese. The
Australian government subscribed to irrational fears that FRETILIN’s rise to power in a small,
underdeveloped island, would lead to the spread of communism throughout Southeastern Asia.
Officials also saw the advantage of perfecting the Timor Gap Treaty with Indonesia as opposed
to East Timor. Because of this, Australia acknowledged the integration of East Timor into
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Indonesia and, though it occasionally brought up the issue of human rights in discussions with
the Indonesian government, made no move to pressure Indonesia into actually improving these
conditions. Australia’s proximity to East Timor allowed information about what was happening
on the island to reach the public, however, and this created a public support base for the
Timorese that grew as the years went on. Eventually, this support transformed Australia into the
leading member behind the U.N. independence referendum and associated resolutions.
Portugal-Timor Relations
Though the military coup of 1974 in Portugal successfully overthrew the standing
authoritarian government, it inherited a nation with dwindling international powers and several
internal issues. Because of this weak state, Portugal was ultimately unable to properly
administrate the decolonization of East Timor. In an attempt to transfer East Timor from its
power in an orderly fashion, Portugal held a Decolonization Commission to determine the
island’s future. The Commission created a detailed plan for East Timor that terminated
Portuguese authority within three years, planned for popular elections to occur by 1976, and
attempted to balance the power between FRETILIN, UDT, and APODETI.81 Following this
Decolonization Commission, however, civil war erupted among the Timorese political parties.
Once FRETILIN emerged as the victor, Indonesia invaded East Timor and established its
occupation. Considering the crises occurring in Portugal’s African colonies of Mozambique,
Angola, and Guinea-Bissau, the new and feeble government had little ability to punish Indonesia
for violating the decolonization plan, which in had the full force of Portuguese law. Additionally,
many of the authoritarian placements into the territorial governments were not replaced during
the Carnation Revolution, meaning that the Portuguese leaders of East Timor were unsupportive
and often at odds with the new Portuguese government.
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Unlike the U.S. and Australia, Portugal remained committed to the principle of selfdetermination for East Timor throughout the occupation. Though they did not have the ability to
remove Indonesia from the island, Portugal refused to recognize East Timor as part of Indonesia.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, this was a passive commitment for the Portuguese, provoking José
Ramos-Horta, the current president of East Timor, to blame the “erosion of the voting block in
support of the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination” in the early 1980s on
Portugal’s “criminal negligence and political cowardice.”82 In 1986, however, Portugal joined
the European Economic Commission (E.E.C.) and the European Parliament. Portugal used their
participation in the E.E.C. to develop support from other European countries and was the driving
force behind the 1993 U.N. Commission of Human Rights resolution that supported East
Timor’s right to self-determination.
After making the decision to decolonize East Timor in the 1970s, Portugal owed a
responsibility to the Timorese people to ensure that their right to self-determination was
preserved. The failure of this responsibility occurred in 1975 and for years afterward, as Portugal
did little to ensure that the rights of East Timor were recognized. Unlike all other major players
in the East Timor crisis, however, Portugal never recognized Indonesia’s occupation of East
Timor as integration. In the late 1980s and onward, Portugal used its growing influence to gather
support for East Timor.
United Nations Inaction
Under Chapter IX of the United Nations Charter, the U.N. pledges to uphold equal rights
and self-determination and requires its members to promote the advancement of peoples defined
as living in colonies or non-self-governing territories. As a Portuguese territory, East Timor fell
clearly under this regulation. Beginning in 1975, after the initial Indonesian invasion, until 1982,
82

The Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste, Part 7.1, Section 2.2, 15.

38

the U.N. passed an annual resolution in the General Assembly supporting East Timor’s right to
self-determination. These resolutions were kept alive largely by Third World or socialist states
and enjoyed only miniscule Western representation consisting of Portugal, Cyprus, Greece, and
Iceland.83 In 1982, the General Assembly passed the matter on to the Secretary-General in order
to find a solution to the problem. This effectively deferred consideration of the matter every year
based on the progress report of the Secretary-General.84
Fortunately for East Timor, the discussion of the crisis, though no longer assessed by the
General Assembly, was being kept alive in specialty groups such as the Commission on Human
Rights and the Decolonization Committee. These groups contributed to the spread of knowledge
about the crisis, which Indonesia had done its best to prevent, and helped to garner support for
the Timorese cause. Finally, in 1999, President Suharto was forced to resign from Indonesian
government. His interim successor, President Habibie, pressured by these U.N. groups as well as
the Indonesian civil public, announced that he would recommend separation of East Timor from
Indonesia.
The U.N. mandated a vote by the Timorese to decide whether they desired integration
with Indonesia or independence. To protect the legitimacy of the ballot and ensure voters’ safety,
the U.N. created the United Nations Mission in East Timor (U.N.A.M.E.T.), comprising of U.N.
volunteers, military liaison officers, civilian police, and local staff. With U.N.A.M.E.T.
overseeing the process, 78.5% of East Timorese voted for independence.
The benefits and detriments of the U.N. as an organization were displayed throughout the
East Timor crisis. With major superpowers intent on allying with Indonesia in the early stages
after invasion, placing economic interests above human rights conditions, the U.N. was of little
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use to the Timorese people. Though resolutions were passed yearly, no sanctions were approved
for Indonesia and emergency humanitarian assistance was never offered to East Timor. At the
same time, however, these resolutions gave East Timor an international legal basis that later
played a critical role in helping East Timor to achieve independence. While actions were taken to
stop the potential of Indonesian violence after the vote, U.N.A.M.E.T. was ultimately incapable
of containing the Indonesian militias. In response, the U.N. sponsored a force team to support
U.N.A.M.E.T. called the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET). The U.N. refused to
deploy this team without the express permission of the Indonesian government, however, and
because of this their deployment was delayed for 16 days. Once again, though U.N. action was
ultimately necessary and beneficial to the Timorese people, its process of commitment was timeconsuming and costly.
Timor Today
Today, the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste is a sovereign nation. The devastating
effects of the last century – Japanese occupation and Allied bombing in World War II, strife with
the mother country Portugal in the 1960s and 1970s, Indonesian occupation and the struggle for
independence from 1975 to 2002, and rioting throughout the last decade – have contributed to
place this new republic at the low number of 147 on the Human Development Index.85 Of all
countries residing in what is considered the East Asian and Pacific Region, Timor-Leste ranks
above only three other countries. Of all nations recognized by the U.S. government, Timor-Leste
is above only seven in terms of public access to internet.86 As has been seen in the 21st century,
the internet is not only a vehicle for information and education but a tool of social change and
revolution.
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Timor-Leste has also struggled, like many former colonies, with a turbulent political
environment. Prior to Indonesian occupation, East Timor had been ruled by local kings and
communal violence. Though democracy has replaced this system, political violence is still high
on the island. Nearly seventy percent of Timorese men are involved in these gangs, most of
which are associated with political groups or particular officials. Corruption within the
government is also an issue, especially with frequent practice of nepotism.
Despite these setbacks, the future is not completely bleak for Timor-Leste. In 2005, its
economy had positive growth. Both of Time-Leste’s elected presidents have avoided external
debt, decreased inflation, and sought local food security.87 Australia has also renegotiated the
Timor Gap Treaty with Timor-Leste with extremely favorable terms to the new country. Of the
lands designated as joint territory, Timor-Leste receives ninety percent of the profits and
Australia only ten percent. Recently, international efforts have also been refocused on TimorLeste, providing much needed infrastructure rebuilding and economic aid. On March 17th, 2012,
East Timor held a peaceful, democratic election to choose its third publicly-elected president.
Conclusion
For nearly thirty years, the right to self-determination of the Timorese was suppressed
through the actions of the Indonesian government. Fearful of the affect an independent,
supposedly communist nation would have on Indonesian islands harboring separatist sentiments,
Indonesia ignored Portuguese law and the declaration of independence by East Timor and
invaded the area in 1975. Indonesia occupied the territory until 1999 through fear and brutality.
The Indonesian military used tactics such as torture, forced deportation, and starvation through
the destruction of food sources in order to eliminate Timorese independence and resistance
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groups. Violence was not limited to those who resisted the occupation: studies show that 88.7%
of non-fatal violations of human rights occurred against civilians who were not a part of the
resistance.88 In order to foster international support for the occupation, Indonesia submitted false
information to governments and gave away resources and territory belonging to East Timor. It
was not until the fall of President Suharto and the New Order regime in 1999 that Indonesia
acknowledged that the self-determination of the Timorese people had been violated.
Though it stood in a unique position to influence Indonesian action, the United States
acquiesced to the invasion. Fearing FRETILIN was a communist-oriented group, high ranking
officials believed that if FRETILIN came to power, other nations would fall to communism. The
U.S. also looked toward its monetary investments into Indonesia, Indonesia’s resources, and the
establishment of the New Order regime that had received U.S. aid in order to assume power.
These economic interests were ultimately viewed as more important than the humanitarian issue
of ensuring self-determination and ceasing the killing and torture of Timorese citizens. As a
result, the U.S. chose to believe the false Indonesian reports concerning Timor despite the
evidence submitted to the contrary and did not pressure Indonesia on the Timor crisis until the
1990s. Although the U.S. could have pressured Indonesia into an alternate course of action with
little economic consequence, especially considering its knowledge of the invasion plans prior to
December of 1975, it chose not to do so.
Similarly, Australia considered its own economic interests in the reassessment of its
maritime boundaries with East Timor and took little action against Indonesia for the invasion or
following occupation. While the government viewed East Timor as an unviable independent
state, Australian citizens over the years formed a support network for the independence
movement. Journalists fought to have information smuggled out of East Timor and dispersed to
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the public, increasing public support for the Timorese people. Eventually, this support from
everyday people forced the Australian government to sponsor change for East Timor through the
United Nations.
Portugal also takes its share of the blame in the Timor crisis, as it neglected to enforce the
Timorese right to self-determination after deciding to decolonize the island. This irresponsible
action on the part of the newly formed Portuguese government left the Timorese completely
vulnerable to continued Indonesian occupation. Considering how weak the country was during
this time period, however, it is possible to say that Portugal attempted to support the Timorese as
best as they could. Portugal consistently supported East Timor in the United Nations, refused to
recognize Indonesia’s integration of the territory unlike many other countries, and attempted to
foster support from other countries for the Timorese.
Finally, until the 1990s, the United Nations was wholly ineffective at enforcing national
law of self-determination. Without the support of major powers like the United States or
Australia, the U.N. could do little to support the Timorese people. Through the 1990s and 2000s,
however, the U.N. was essential in arranging a referendum for independence and protecting the
stability and security of the vote.
Unfortunately for its people, East Timor garnered no support from international entities
supporting its right to self-determination. Action by any of these actors in the crisis – the U.S.,
Australia, Portugal, or the U.N. – could have prevented or at the least decreased the severity of
the crisis. The U.S. and Australia placed their economic interests above the human rights of the
Timorese people, while Portugal and the U.N. proved to be powerless without the support of
other major powers. Because of this lack of support for East Timor, Indonesia was able to invade
and occupy the island with unchecked brutality.
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